Introduction

On April 21, 2025, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) issued its first-ever settlement order under Section 48A (3) of the Competition Act, 2002 in a case against Google LLC in relation to its Android TV ecosystem. More than a tech antitrust dispute, the order, with a penalty of ₹20.24 crore and a 15% fine for cooperation, is a victory for the government. This is the first time where a methodology has been implemented that completely changes the way competition enforcement is conducted in India, the settlement and commitment mechanism added by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023.

The focus of the blog is not regarding the existence of the framework per se, but whether it fulfils its objective of expeditious enforcement and regulatory accountability. Further, India has adopted parts of European and American models, so, it becomes necessary to study, if India has rightly adopted those models, with appropriate checks and balances.

The Framework in Brief: Two Tracks, Two Moments

The Amendment of 2023 adds two different, but related, mechanisms. The commitment framework, under Section 48B, is applicable before the investigation report of the Director General (“DG”) is received by the party,  wherein once an enterprise raises a prima facie order (extendable by 30 days), it can find a solution by proposing behavioural remedies that address the preliminary concerns of the CCI. During this time, the proceedings of the DG are suspended and if commitments are accepted, a finding of infringement is not recorded. The entire procedure has to be completed in 90 days.

On the other hand, once the DG has submitted investigation report, the settlement framework under Section 48A is triggered. In the following, the enterprise is not called into action with preliminary findings but with real findings. The total time period must be completed within 120 days from the date of receipt of the DG Report (extendable by 30 days) and applications must be submitted within 45 days from that date. Unlike commitments, settlements involve the applicant directly addressing the matter in relation to the findings of DG, proposing suitable remedies and payment of penalty, which can be reduced by up to 15% based on the cooperation and transparency of disclosures in terms of Regulation 6 of the CCI (Settlement) Regulations, 2024.

The Case for Negotiated Outcomes

Delay has been a persistent challenge in the Indian Competition law regime. The average antitrust investigation has proven to be a lengthy process, and the CCI has been able to recover less than 2.5% of the total amount of penalties imposed between 2018 and 2021, largely because many orders were challenged in appeal. Decisions in landmark cases such as FICCI – Multiplex Association of India v. United Producers/Distributors Forum, illustrate how proceedings often continued for years after the Commission’s decision, as they are often followed by a wave of long litigation.

The settlement and commitment mechanism directly tackles this structural issue. In the business world, this mechanism provide the enterprises, the certainty of cost, limited liability and protection of reputation. For CCI, this mechanism saves time and resources, and help restore healthy competitive conditions in the market in a timely manner. The Competition Law Review Committee (“CLRC”) Report, 2019 which recommended this change, based its recommendation on the idea of aligning the Indian framework closer to internationally best practices, and to lessen the burden of the lengthy litigation process.

In this light, the Google Android TV settlement is a major step forward, marking the first settlement order under Section 48A. Google proposed several behavioural commitments, including the New India Agreement, allowing OEMs to obtain standalone Play Store licences without the accompanying obligations. CCI accepted these commitments in light of DG’s findings, and the dispute was resolved without prolonged appellate litigation process.

Comparative Framework

As recognised by CLRC, the Indian settlement framework draws inspiration from both the European and the American models. While the 15% penalty reduction is derived from the European Commission’s settlement notice that gives a 10% reduction in penalty in cartel cases, accounting for almost half of all such settlements in the European Commission. The exclusion of appellate mechanism to ensure the strict enforcement and finality of settlement agreement is based on the American consent decree regime, as in United States v. Microsoft Corporation, where settlements involved behaviour-based measures without financial or structural penalty, subject to supervision and control of the DOJ through Final Judgment.

The difficulty, however, lies not in India’s decision to borrow from established foreign models, but in the manner of that adoption. The European law offers a small reduction in fine along with the appellate mechanism. The American consent decree system involves strict judicial supervision and the entry of the order by the court under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties (Tunney) Act, giving it supervisory powers to take suo moto action as well. However, India has taken the procedural efficiency from both the jurisdictions, but the necessary safeguards in the form of appellate mechanism is not present in the system.

SEBI provides a useful institutional model, and provides requisite experience. While the settlement mechanism introduced by SEBI has been evolving since 2014 and amended under the 2018 Regulations, the structure of such multi-tiered evaluation through Internal Committee, High Powered Advisory Committee and Whole Time Members has proven to be feasible without sacrificing speed. However, the CCI lacks such structure. This is not merely a procedural issue, but of accountability. A framework mechanism that provides significant discretionary powers to an institution, that framework must also provide proper mechanisms of oversight. This will ensure that efficiency is not achieved at the perils of fairness and transparency.

What the Framework Gets Wrong

1. The Non-Appealability Problem

Settlement and commitment orders are final orders. Appeals are not permitted under section 53B as a result of section 48B (7). The most plausible reason behind this mechanism is certainty and finality. These are preconditions for a working settlement regime. However, the lack of any appeal structure creates some serious questions about the adequacy of the procedures.

Settlement proceedings inherently involve unequal bargaining power. CCI effectively determines the terms of settlement, while the enterprise may only accept these terms or withdraw from the settlement. Given the absence of appellate review, neither the Commission’s exercise of discretion nor the proportionality of the remedies is subject to meaningful external scrutiny. This opacity is compounded by the lack of public commentary in settlement proceedings as opposed to commitments, where public commentary is allowed.

This is compared to the European Commission’s settlement system under Regulation (EC) No. 622/2008. In the case of EC settlement decisions, the proceedings are also streamlined, but there is still the possibility to challenge the procedure before the General Court and finally the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Alrosa jurisprudence, in the case of Commission

1. Alrosa Company Ltd., reinforces the Commission’s broad discretion in accepting commitments without conducting a comprehensive proportionality analysis. Judicial review in the High Court or Supreme Court for manifest error is still available but, as the ECJ did not do away with judicial review altogether, it merely lowered the threshold. This is not the case in India where there is no such judicial safeguard at the moment.
2. The Section 53N Gap

The most fundamental lacunae in the structure of the mechanism is related to follow-on damages claims. If the anti-competitive behaviour causes injury to a party, they can seek compensation from the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of Section 53N of the Competition Act. The 2023 Amendment adds settlement and commitment provisions, but does not expressly bar settlement applicants from being subject to such claims.

This is not an unpremeditated neglect. In the event that such an enterprise settles with the CCI (by paying a lesser penalty in lieu of behavioural obligations), it may still be liable to damages proceedings by those that have been affected. The settlement order is not an admission of liability, but the findings of the DG and the applicant’s own disclosures (which can be found in the settlement order) can be used in subsequent proceedings. Even if an enterprise agrees to behavioural remedies, it will not be shielded from future complaints for previous actions.

The EC’s commitment decision in Hynix Semiconductor, which was subsequently challenged by a third party, illustrates that negotiated outcomes do not necessarily preclude later proceedings. In the absence of sufficient safeguards, enterprises facing significant civil liability may have little incentive to settle voluntarily.

3. Absence of a Preliminary Assessment Mechanism

A third structural deficiency in the Indian Framework lies in the aspect that, in India, the enterprise seeking recourse to the commitment framework needs to submit the commitment proposal well in advance along with the application itself. At this stage, the only plausible material available with the enterprise is CCI’s prima facie order. This order merely records the CCI’s opinion that an investigation is required. This order might not completely and in true sense identify the specific concerns which the applicant is expected to address. Thus, the enterprises are required to provide behavioural remedies on the basis of this limited guidance only. Henceforth, this increases the likelihood that the commitments might prove to be inadequate or require intensive revisions.

However, European Union adopts a more structured approach. Rather than requiring parties to submit detailed commitments at the outset, European Commission firstly requires them to indicate their willingness to opt for commitment. When the Commission is satisfied that parties are genuinely prepared to address the dispute, the commission issues a preliminary assessment, as per Article 9 of Regulation 01/2003. In this, the principal facts of the case and competition concerns are set out. This document provides a clear basis upon which the parties can formulate or refine their commitments. Thus, it facilitates a more transparent and effective negotiation process.

The Indian framework would benefit from this kind of framework, as it will facilitate more comprehensive and nuanced commitment proposal, as CCI would be required to submit its main competition concerns. Thus, it will provide a base for enterprise, while providing its commitments, resulting in procedural transparency, and reducing uncertainty for investigated enterprises.

The Road Ahead

The Google Android TV settlement marks a significant milestone in the evolution of India’s competition law framework. However, the significance of a landmark decision lies not merely in its novelty, but in the fact that it serves as the starting point for the practical development of the law. The first application provides only a preliminary indication of the framework’s effectiveness. Its true strengths and weaknesses will emerge only as it is applied in more complex disputes involving less cooperative parties.

It should be mentioned here that even in Google case there was one dissenting opinion stating that, the agreement between Google and the CCI that included TADA still preserved anti-competitive practices.

For the framework to mature, there are three things that should be done to remove the difficulties: firstly, a revision of the legislative act concerning the interplay between the settlements and Section 53N damage claims is necessary. Secondly, the provision for appellate review mechanism is needed. Lastly, there is need for preliminary assessment mechanism by CCI for commitments framework, ensuring nuanced commitment models.